It’s time to prepare for Iran’s political collapse
By Ray
Takeyh July 5
In recent congressional testimony, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sensibly stressed that the United States should“work towards support of those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government.” The commentariat was aghast, and the Islamic republic registered a formal protest note. Both parties seemed surprised that the United States has long assisted those seeking democratic change. During the Cold War, secretaries of state routinely assured those trapped behind the Iron Curtain that America supported their aspirations. Given that Iran is ruled by an aging Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the United States should be prepared for a transition of power there that may yet precipitate the collapse of the entire system.
In recent congressional testimony, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sensibly stressed that the United States should“work towards support of those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government.” The commentariat was aghast, and the Islamic republic registered a formal protest note. Both parties seemed surprised that the United States has long assisted those seeking democratic change. During the Cold War, secretaries of state routinely assured those trapped behind the Iron Curtain that America supported their aspirations. Given that Iran is ruled by an aging Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the United States should be prepared for a transition of power there that may yet precipitate the collapse of the entire system.
In a region littered with failed states, Iran is often
mischaracterized as an island of stability. The history of the Islamic
republic, however, is a turbulent one, featuring a constant struggle between an
authoritarian regime and restive population seeking democratic empowerment.
When they first assumed power, the clerical oligarchs waged bloody street
battles to repress other members of the revolutionary coalition who did not
share their desire for a theocratic dictatorship. In the 1990s, they faced the
rise of a reform movement that remains the most exhilarating attempt to
harmonize religion and pluralism. The reformists spoke about reconsidering
Khamenei’s absolutist pretensions and expanding civil society and critical
media. The regime reacted with its usual mixture of terror and intimidation to
eviscerate the movement. And then came the Green Revolt in summer 2009 that
forever delegitimized the system and severed the bonds between state and
society.
The one thing certain about Iran’s future is that another
protest movement will rise at some point seeking to displace the regime.
Today, the Islamic republic lumbers on as the Soviet Union
did during its last years. It professes an ideology that convinces no one. It
commands security services that proved unreliable in the 2009 rebellion,
causing the regime to deploy the Basij militias because many commanders of the
Revolutionary Guards refused to shoot the protesters.
The seminaries in the shrine city of
Qom appreciate the damage that the government of God has done to Islam as the
mosques remain empty even during important religious commemorations. Young men
don’t wish to join the clergy, and women don’t want to marry clerics. The
system is engulfed by corruption, which is particularly problematic for a
regime that bases its power on divine ordinance. And Iran just underwent a
presidential election where the winner, Hassan Rouhani, promised freedoms he has no intention of delivering and
further delegitimized the government by airing its dirty laundry on issues of
craft and repression. Today, the Islamic republic will not be able to manage a
succession to the post of the supreme leader as its factions are too divided
and its public too disaffected.
The regime does, however, have one thing in its favor: its
nuclear agreement with the international community (officially known as the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA.) Historically, arms-control treaties
have generated their own constituency. During the 1970s, at the height of
U.S.-Soviet arms-control diplomacy, influential voices in the West did not want
to pressure the Kremlin for fear that it would disrupt the agreements. The
Islamic republic can count on similar forbearance from critical sectors of
Washington. Many will feign concern about Iran’s terrorism or human rights
abuses, but will rebuff attempts to impose truly crippling sanctions on Tehran.
The legitimacy and longevity of the regime will not be questioned by those
whose foremost priority is sustaining a deficient arms-control accord. And it
was this sentiment that Tillerson challenged when he called for making common
cause with those struggling for freedom inside Iran. The amorality of arms
control has little room for such lofty and idealistic ambitions.
The task of a judicious U.S. government today is to plan for
the probable outbreak of another protest movement or the sudden passing of
Khamenei that could destabilize the system to the point of collapse. How can we
further sow discord in Iran’s vicious factional politics? How can the United
States weaken the regime’s already unsteady security services? This will
require not just draining the Islamic republic’s coffers but also finding ways
to empower its domestic critics. The planning for all this must start today;
once the crisis breaks out, it will be too late for America to be a player.
In March 1953, when Joseph Stalin
died, President Dwight Eisenhower asked to see his government’s studies about
how to exploit the Soviet succession crisis. There were none. An exasperated
Eisenhower exclaimed, “For about seven years, ever since 1946, I know that
everybody who should have been concerned with such things has been sounding off
on what we should do when Stalin dies…. Well he did — and we want to see what
bright ideas were in the files of this government, what plans were laid. What
we found was that the result of seven years of yapping is exactly zero.
We have no plan.” For his part, Tillerson has established the guidepost that
should direct U.S. foreign policy. The task for the administration now is to
study ways that we can take advantage of Iran’s looming crisis to potentially
displace one of America’s most entrenched adversaries.
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